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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order dated 
August 25, 1992 (granting partial summary judgment on 
liability only) and a final Order and Judgment dated December 
16, 1992. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's Motion to Amend its Answer to assert fraud in the 
inducement? The standard for review is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in the circumstances of the case 
by refusing the amendment. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way 
Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on liability despite 
evidence of the existence of fraud in the inducement? In 
reviewing such issue, all pleadings, evidence, admissions and 
inferences therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to Defendant/Appellant. Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 
P.2d 266 (Utah 1962); Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
1977). 
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3. Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on damages based on a "per annum" 
interest 
rate despite language in the Note stating a flat interest 
rate? The standard for review is the same as noted in 
paragraph 2. 
4. Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the 
interest rate? In reviewing such issue, all pleadings, 
evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom must be viewed 
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff/Appellee. See cases 
cited in paragraph 2. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Defendant does not contend any authorities are 
determinative of any issues involved in the appeal. However, 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3 have a bearing on 
the issues relating to the interest rate addressed in Points 
III and IV. The wording of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3 is as 
follows: 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, 
any certain rate of interest is mentioned 
and no period of time is stated, interest 
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shall be calculated at the rate mentioned 
by the year, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. 
This is an action to enforce the provisions of a 
Promissory Note (R. 108-109) executed by Defendant 
(hereinafter "Gump & Ayers") pursuant to a Settlement 
Agreement (R. 104-106) which was intended to settle and 
compromise Gump & Ayers1 liability to Plaintiff (hereinafter 
"Union Park") 
for past and future rents under a pre-existing lease of real 
property. 
Gump & Ayers executed the Settlement Agreement and 
Promissory Note in reliance on the prior representation of 
Union Park that the leased premises were still vacant with no 
prospects for a replacement tenant (R. 192). Thus, a portion 
of the principal of the Promissory Note was attributable to 
settle Union Park's claims for future rents under the lease 
(R. 194-195). If Gump & Ayers had known that the leased 
premises had already been re-let to replacement tenant, it 
would not have executed a Promissory Note for a principal sum 
in excess of the total of accrued rents (R. 192). 
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At the time Gump & Ayers filed its Answer, it had 
received information that the representations of Union Park 
were false, i.e., that the leased premises had already been 
leased to a replacement tenant prior to execution of the 
Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note (R. 195-196). Thus, 
Gump & Ayers had reason to believe that the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note had been procured by fraud on 
the part of Union Park. However, after considering this 
information, counsel for Gump & Ayers, in a good faith effort 
to comply with Rule 11, U.R.C.P., refrained from asserting 
fraud as a defense until the information could be confirmed 
and corroborated (R. 195-196). 
At a later point in the litigation, Gump & Ayers 
confirmed the accuracy of the information concerning fraud (R. 
135-155). Accordingly, counsel for Gump & Ayers immediately 
moved the Court to amend Gump & Ayers1 Answer to assert the 
defense of fraud in inducing the execution of the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note (R. 235). 
On August 25, 1992, the lower court denied Gump & Ayers1 
Motion to Amend, and granted summary judgment on the issue of 
liability under the Promissory Note despite clear evidence 
that execution of the Promissory Note was induced by fraud on 
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the part of Union Park (R. 470-472); (copy of the Order 
attached as Exhibit "C"). 
The Promissory Note provided: ". . • this Note shall 
bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after 
May 1, 1988." (R. 108-109) There was no suggestion of a "per 
annum" interest rate. The Promissory Note, including the 
language relating to the interest rate, was unilaterally 
drafted by Union Park and its attorneys (R. 251). 
On December 16, 1992, the lower court computed the 
judgment amount on the basis of an interest rate of 10% per 
annum and entered judgment in the sum of $35,157.59. At the 
same time, the lower court denied Gump & Ayers1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment wherein Gump & Ayers sought a ruling that the 
interest rate should be limited to a flat rate of 10% (R. 606-
608) (copy of Order and Judgment attached as Addendum Exhibit 
"D"). These rulings were made on the basis of the wording of 
the Note without consideration of extrinsic evidence. See 
transcript of Judge's bench ruling of November 30, 1992, p. 1 
(R. 743-748) (copy of transcript attached as Addendum Exhibit 
"B"). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
On or about June 1, 1983, Gump & Ayers and Union Park 
entered into a Lease Agreement wherein Gump & Ayers, as 
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lessee, leased approximately 4,497 square feet of office space 
in a building owned by Union Park at Union Park Center in 
Midvale, Utah, (Lloyd Affidavit, paras. 5, 6; Exhibit A, R. 
54, 65-80). The Lease was for a period of ten years (Lloyd 
Affidavit, para. 6; Exhibit A R. 54, 65-80). 
On or about June 28, 1985, the parties entered into a 
second Lease for an additional 912 square feet adjacent to the 
existing leased office space (Lloyd Affidavit, paras. 7,8; 
Exhibit B, R. 54-55, 81-102). The second Lease was intended 
to expire at or about the same time as the first Lease (Lloyd 
Affidavit, para. 9, R. 55). 
The office space included in both of the leases will 
hereinafter be referred to as "subject premises." 
Gump & Ayers is a licensed real estate broker engaged in 
the business of selling, purchasing and leasing real property. 
(Floor Affidavit, para. 2, R. 189). By reason of adverse 
conditions in the real estate market, Gump & Ayers determined 
that it must close several of its offices including the office 
at the subject premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 4. R. 190). 
Gump & Ayers substantially vacated the subject premises on May 
28, 1988 (Floor Affidavit, para. 4, R. 190). 
At the time it vacated the premises, Gump & Ayers was 
fully aware that it remained liable for future lease payment 
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obligations despite the fact that the subject premises had 
been vacated. Gump & Ayers was further aware that Union Park 
had an obligation to mitigate this liability by expending 
efforts to find a replacement tenant (Floor Affidavit, para. 
5, R. 190-191). During the period beginning when the premises 
was vacated in May, 1988, and continuing through mid-November, 
1988, there was frequent communication between Gump & Ayers 
and Union Park concerning their efforts to find a replacement 
tenant to occupy the vacant subject premises (Floor Affidavit, 
para. 5, R. 190-191). 
Almost immediately after Gump & Ayers vacated the subject 
premises, Gump & Ayers contacted Matrix Funding Corporation 
(hereinafter "Matrix") in an effort to persuade it to occupy 
the subject premises and thereby decrease the ongoing 
liability of Gump & Ayers. Matrix was a co-tenant that 
occupied other space in the 
same building. Matrix expressed some interest in occupying 
the vacated premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 6, R. 191). 
Gump & Ayers immediately notified Union Park of the 
interests of Matrix in occupying the vacated leased premises. 
However, at the time of the notice, Union Park indicated that 
they had already communicated with Matrix and Matrix was not 
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interested in occupying the vacant subject premises (Floor 
Affidavit, para. 6, R. 191). 
In mid-November, 1988, Union Park initiated communication 
with Gump & Ayers concerning the subject premises. At that 
time Union Park represented to Gump & Ayers that the premises 
were still vacant, no prospective tenants had been located and 
invited Gump & Ayers to negotiate a lump-sum figure to finally 
settle and compromise Gump & Ayers1 liability for past and 
future lease payments (Floor Affidavit, para. 7, R. 191-192). 
In reliance on the statements of Union Park, Gump & Ayers 
entered into negotiations to settle and compromise its 
liability for past and future rent payments (Floor Affidavit, 
para. 7, R. 191-192). 
The negotiations between Union Park and Gump & Ayers 
resulted in a Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note dated 
December 7, 1988 (Floor Affidavit, para. 8, R. 102). A copy 
of the Settlement Agreement (R. 104-106) is attached as 
Addendum Exhibit "E". A copy of the Promissory Note (R. 108-
109) is attached as Addendum Exhibit "F". 
The Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note were 
intended to pay and discharge all liability of Gump & Ayers 
for lease payments that had accrued through November, 1988, 
together with an amount in excess of accrued lease payments in 
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settlement of liability for future lease payments accruing on 
the vacant premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 8, R. 192). 
The accrued lease payments to November, 1988, totaled 
$52,613.82, (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195). The 
Settlement Agreement provided for the payment of $20,000 in 
cash (paid in two installments) in addition to the Promissory 
Note in the principal sum of $55,000 (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 
18, R. 56-57). Thus, the sum of $22,386.18 of the settlement 
amount was attributable to compromising Gump & Ayers1 
liability for future lease payments ($75,000 - $52,613.82 = 
$22,386.18) (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195). 
In negotiating the Settlement Agreement and Promissory 
Note, Gump & Ayers relied on the statements by Union Park that 
the premises remained vacant and the no prospective tenant had 
been located. This reliance prompted Gump & Ayers to agree to 
pay the $22,386.18 in excess of rental payments that had 
accrued to the date of the agreement (Floor Affidavit, paras. 
9, R. 192). 
After commencement of the instant litigation, Gump & 
Ayers learned that the subject premises had been leased to 
Matrix on November 23, 1988, two weeks prior to the date of 
the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note (Floor Affidavit, 
para. 18, R. 195-196; Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28 (R. 60). The 
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Lease Agreement between Union Park and Matrix, bearing the 
d . i t Il III j h i i i l l u mi I II 'in n II in ill I a c h e HI II II 11 I I  I f i d a i i | „ „ i 
Thomas Lloyd as Exhibit "E" (R 135-155). The Lease was laiei 
amended to ^pand the leased space on February -.., ^ _
 v«. 
1 
If Gump S Aye:^ ha."1 )..-•- 1_1 ^ ^h: premises haJ v~r~ 
leased to Matrix -•- ^-^ei^her °7 ""-••'- & Avers wou." 
have agreec ....
 H. . ;XJCL. . . 
compromise of their future rer•al liability (Floor Affidavit, 
paras 
A. .. . ,. ...^  w.4.w. ,-. V asse.u^ _ . :::s: :u. ;........ 
Summary Judgment iwh.:.:: was qranted ..- liability only), 
assert frauo .... induciiij 
Accordingly. ;:. an apparent, attempt fc demonstrat.e that Union 
P 
conclusory statements1 to persuade the lower court that the 
fruits of its fraud should be ignored inasmuch as Union Park's 
losses in re-letting the premises to Matrix exceeded the 
fruits of the fraud. (See footnote 1). 
This unsupported legal proposition that a perpetrator of 
fraud may justify the fraud upon a showing (to the extent 
conclusory statements constitute a "showing") of losses 
sustained by the fraudulent scheme was accepted by the lower 
court. See Transcript of Judge's ruling on January 10, 1992, 
(R. 436-448). A copy of the ruling is attached as Addendum 
Exhibit "A". 
FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO AMEND 
TO ASSERT FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT 
On or about February 14, 1990, Jerry Floor (CEO of Gump 
& Ayers) attended a social gathering also attended by an 
1
 Union Park claimed that it was "forced" to agree with 
Matrix to relet the subject premises at a lower rental (Lloyd 
Affidavit, para. 28, R. 60) and that Union Park was "forced" 
to incur $18,559 for leasehold improvements on the subject 
premises (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 30, R. 60). On the basis of 
these conclusory statements, with no evidence as to the 
reasonable rental value of the premises, no evidence as to the 
reasonableness and necessity for the leasehold improvements, 
and with no deduction for the increase in the value of its 
asset by reason of the leasehold improvements, Union Park 
asserted losses of $50,665.41 in excess of the $75,000 it 
received from Gump & Ayers. (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 32, R. 
61-62). There was no allowance for the enhanced value of 
Union Park's property (which would be realized at the 
termination of the lease) with respect to the capital 
improvements. 
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ployee of Matrix. During the course of the conversation, 
* • ."^f'd "'^  F: premises 
previously occupied b> ... a Ayers aiK* ..uL^  ~^ naa oeen 
possession • "* : ne property . :;K>* Gump *. -Yvers vacated :;!ie 
immediately confronted Union raik wiui U.J.& mlormat-u > -u.c 
Union Park denied rhe accuracy of t:ie information (Floor 
At v.::* - .nit v.iuiiip c* Ayers deliverer1 the Summons and 
Complaint to r - attorney. c^ r?y- & AVHTF ar -ed their attorney 
the subject premises had already neen ;e ; -r\: -.: the time of 
the execution of tu^ Settlement Agreeme^* nd Promissory Note. 
Gump !i AyeiL.1 attoinu >' dull eiininei. ; :^ I it^.c: . . I lie 
circumstances under which the statement was made and the later 
deni - -* .-,-*:.... ^mp0se(q 
jiuaea ni«. :: ^ » a^oeiL^ng tr*t defen^. : -- --d in 
the inducement without further verificatioi (Floor Affidavit, 
parf 
Gump & Ayei^- . . * uu a:, jciii^vo ., . .ii.axi,t on or ^^.^^ 
December • reason c: 'ounse/s views as 
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inducement was not asserted as a defense. However, the Answer 
did contain the following: 
Defendant reserves the right to conduct 
discovery to determine if the Promissory 
Note was procured by fraud. In the event 
discovery produces evidence of fraud, 
Defendant reserves the right to amend 
this Answer to assert fraud in the 
inducement. (R. 16). 
On or about February 25, 1991, Gump & Ayers received a 
copy of the Lease Agreement between Union Park Associates and 
Matrix with respect to the subject premises (hereinafter 
"Matrix Lease") (Lloyd Affidavit, Exhibit E, R. 135-155). 
The Matrix Lease was dated November 22, 1988, more than 
two weeks prior to the Settlement Agreement and Promissory 
Note. The Matrix Lease involved 10,039 square feet which 
included the subject premises (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28 (R. 
60); Exhibit "E" (R. 135). Shortly thereafter the leased 
premises were extended. (R. 156-157). 
Inasmuch as the Matrix Lease established that the subject 
premises had been leased prior to the Promissory Note and 
Settlement Agreement, the claim of fraud in the inducement of 
the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note was sufficiently 
corroborated thereby justifying Defendant's counsel in 
formally asserting the defense of fraud in the inducement. 
On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion to Amend 
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its Answer * assert :he ^ ^ e n s e of frau .n the- inducement 
( 
Counterclaim asserting fraud <- proposed Amended 
Answer (I t 238-241) asserted the defense ot fraun •-> the Thi^d 
Af I i I;IIIH ti • = D efense l( 
243-248) also asserted affirmative claims , .. : . fraud 2. 
The Order -** 4- >° la ted August n~ . l°°? denied thf* 
MOL. ..».: > ^  
consideration in adjudicating Union Park's Motion for Summary 
Judgment pn 4 7:'| r p
 : of the order of August 25, 
199.
 t _ attached as Aaaenaum KXIIiM, m i " 
FACTS RELEVANT TO INTEREST RATE 
The Prom ;:i ssor y Nc te execi ited by Gi imp • S I ! ;  • = :i : s :ii n i:J: I = • 
principal sum of $55 ,000 w as prepared iiii.il aterallj t } 
Plaintiff and/or its attorneys (Parsons Affidavit, para. 2, I i 
2 i. 
The Promissory Note prepared by Union Park contained the 
following provisions with respect to interest: 
1
 ' Gump & Ayers1 Motion to Amend was initially granted on 
the grounds that Union Park had not opposed the Motion (R. 
402). However, Union Park sought relief from the Order 
granting leave noting its opposition had been overlooked by 
the lower court (R, 404). The Order granting Gump & Ayers 
leave to amend was vacated on September 17, 1991, and the 
court stated it would reconsider the motion at a later date 
(R. 431). The Motion to Amend was later denied as noted in 
the text (R. 435; 470). 
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FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned 
hereby promises to pay to the order of 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park 
Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, 
the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 
DOLLARS ($55,000). This Note shall bear 
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) 
from and after May 1, 1988. (Emphasis 
added). (R. 108-109). See Addendum 
Exhibit "F". 
There is no wording in the Promissory Note which suggests 
that the specified interest rate of 10% was a "per annum" 
rate. 
The Order and Judgment dated December 16, 1992, denied 
Gump & Ayers cross motion for summary judgment seeking a 
declaration that the interest on the Promissory Note is a flat 
rate of 10% rather than a per annum rate. (R. 606-608). 
(Copy of Order is included in Addendum). 
The final judgment dated December 16, 1992, granted 
Plaintiff interest computed at 10% per annum. See Transcript 
of ruling, R. 743-748, Addendum Exhibit "B". In entering the 
judgment, the lower court relied solely upon the wording of 
the Promissory Note without consideration of extrinsic 
evidence. Transcript of ruling (R. 744), Addendum Exhibit 
"B". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: At the time Gump & Ayers filed its Answer, it 
suspected it had been induced to execute the Promissory Note 
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and Settlement Agreement (.:•:-. the basis of fraudulent statements 
] ^owe vet-
hearsay statements u^ iu Uit statements had been denied by Union 
Park, Gump refrained from assertino fraud in 
compli ance i; 
the facts confirming : ;.t existence OL i; -. .*. w^ie aiscuvcied, 
Gump »vers moved to am*-''d . "^ £• * ^r and asser 
( i I • 
Motioi Ayers asserts that such denial was an abuse of 
discretion. 
1 i 
for Summary udgment on i :u issue liability under the 
Promissory Note despite p"H°nfe that the Dromissory Nc4-^ ^ Tac: 
erred in granting summary judgment on iability ; :\ the face of 
evidence that established the promissory Note was procured by 
f rai id» 
POINT III: The Promissory Note, drafted :} (ir.iu:. Park 
and its attorneys, provi ded f~ j 
percent (10%) from and after Ma\ . . «,,.- . .. 
mention of a "per annum" rate of interest. In Its Complaint, 
Union Park 
"per annum" .- , , ^  ,AH= riuiii±.ssor> ^ute. Gump & Ayers 
asserts that the lower court erred in granting judgment which 
included interest at the rate of 10% per annum, 
POINT IV: By reason of the wording of the Promissory 
Note stated under POINT III, Gump & Ayers asserts that the 
lower court erred in denying Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking a declaration of a flat rate of interest 
under the Promissory Note. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER 
AND TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON FRAUD. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, on December 7, 1988, 
Gump & Ayers entered into a Settlement Agreement and 
Promissory Note for the purpose of compromising Gump & Ayers1 
liability under prior leases of office space wherein Gump & 
Ayers was lessee and Union Park was lessor. 
At all times prior to the execution of the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note, Union Park had represented that 
the subject premises remained vacant with no prospects for a 
replacement tenant. Such statement was false, and was known 
to be 
false at the time it was made, inasmuch as Matrix had leased 
the subject premises from Union Park two weeks earlier. 
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]r reliance upon the rppresentatioii that the subject 
I . .....-, :i : s agr ee :i t :: execute tl ie 
Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note which provided for 
the payment of suinc of money :i n excess of the rents that had, 
c : • til E Se t: I::] emen t ft gr e € men t an- ::! Promi ssor } 
Note were executed. 
On or ^ r'"~ ^ i:°brusrx ! -> k -vers "leard from, an 
employee •..* t- si ib j ec t 
premises prior :o •*•-.-• execution of the Settlement Agreement 
and Promissory Note e ' " immediit" -onfronted 
Union Park ...... . .. ..LI^U ana LI;; 4^. -is ^dcegor-w^ll^ 
denied the trutr: . r the statement. 
At the time Gumr -- •-*:,'•- l -—"1 
represent aw..*., stateiu^;. u; L : ^ ilaLiiA 
employee was expressly mentioned. However, inasmuch as the 
Union Park, and inasmuch as iiaud is a ^eiloab allegation, 
counsel to werr- determined that Rule - " I-., 
There LC:.. be no coioicii:u.e claim tnai counsel ! s restraint 
in asserting fraud was not mandated by Rule 11, which provides 
i 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes - "r!-:*-""} on by hi- 4-1-.-i4: 
III 
he has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact . . . and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. (Emphasis added). 
In its Answer to the Complaint, based upon the 
information provided by Gump & Ayers, counsel for Gump & Ayers 
reserved his right to amend the Answer to assert fraud, 
stating: 
Defendant reserves the right to conduct 
discovery to determine if the Promissory 
Note was procured by fraud. In the event 
discovery produces evidence of fraud, 
Defendant reserves 
the right to amend this Answer to assert 
fraud in the inducement. 
As the case progressed, Gump & Ayers obtained a copy of 
the lease between Union Park and Matrix describing the subject 
premises. The document clearly established that the subject 
premises had been leased to Matrix on November 23, 1988, two 
weeks prior to the Promissory Note and Settlement Agreement.3 
On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion to Amend 
its Answer to assert a counterclaim alleging the fraud which 
was now confirmed. During the course of the hearing on 
3
 Gump & Ayers has not been able to determine if Matrix 
occupied the premises prior to the date of the written lease 
as stated by its employee. 
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January : * he low*,-: court denied the Motion to Amend, 
25, 1992. 
The denial of the Motion effectively removed all evidence 
c 
the entry of summary i: -:•. against Gamy % -yeis ui, :_:e 
issue of liability under the Promissory Note. 
• R in :ILI \ =i 
"shall be freely given whe. ustice so requires.11 Gump & 
Ayers respectful ! v submits thai Mp-i^ - •>> circumstances - * 
t 
Motion Amend. 
The ruling of the ] ower * imposes a biivrien^oTnp --** 
impossible dilemma upon a t: bor .^  . . -..^  ..r.^ . 
with Rule ,11 „ The ruling in the instant; c.: t-i is tantamount to 
4
 The Transcript of 1: .1: u i Court"s ruling (R. 436-448, 
Appendix Exhibit "A") indicates the lower court gave 
consideration to the evidence supporting the fraud defense and 
appeared to rule that the fraud was either not material or was 
not sufficiently established. It is difficult to determine 
whether the denial of the Motion to Amend prevented close 
consideration of the evidence in support of the fraud defense, 
materially influenced consideration of such evidence or had no 
effect whatsoever in considering the evidence. However, 
inasmuch as the Motion to Amend was denied, it is presumed 
that the evidence of fraud was not seriously considered by the 
court. In any event, any comment on the evidence establishing 
fraud was dictum. Regardless of the impact on defenses to the 
Complaint, the counterclaim should have been granted which 
would preclude a final summary judgment •'•• "K^ matter. 
a penalty against Gump & Ayers for its good faith compliance 
with Rule 11. 
It is apparent that if Gump & Ayers had asserted fraud on 
the basis of the unconfirmed statement of the employee, and no 
fraud 
had been found to exist, Gump & Ayers and its counsel would be 
defending a Rule 11 motion in this action. 
This impossible dilemma imposed by the lower court should 
be removed by this Court by reversing the order of the trial 
court and mandating that amendments which are timely asserted 
after the parties comply with Rule 11 should be freely 
granted. 
It should further be noted, apart from Rule 11 
considerations, that at the time of the Motion to Amend was 
filed, discovery was uncompleted and no trial date had been 
established in the action. Thus, there was no basis to deny 
the Motion to Amend. In Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert. Denied, 795 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990), this Court held: 
In considering motions to amend 
pleadings, primary considerations are 
whether the parties have adequate notice 
to meet new issues and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or 
disadvantage. Accord, Bekins Bar V Ranch 
v, Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Order denying Gump 
& Ayers1 Motion to Amend should be reversed, and the case 
remanded to the trial court so that the issues of fraud can be 
addressed by way of defense and counterclaim in connection 
with the issues relating to liability under the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEN FACTS BEFORE THE COURT ESTABLISHED FRAUD IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, Gump & Ayers was 
induced to execute the Promissory Note and Settlement 
Agreement in reliance on statements by Union Park that the 
subject premises remained vacant with no prospects for a 
replacement tenant. The facts before the lower court 
established that such representations were false and were 
known to be false at the time they were made. 
The amount of rent that had accrued to the date of the 
execution of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note was 
$52,613.82 (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195). The 
Settlement Agreement provided for the payment of $20,000 in 
cash (paid in two installments) in addition to the Promissory 
Note in the principal sum of $55,000 (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 
18, R. 56-57). Thus, in reliance on the representations of 
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Union Park, Gump & Ayers was induced to agree to pay a total 
of $75,000 which was $22,386.15 in excess of the rents accrued 
to the date of the execution of the Settlement Agreement and 
Promissory Note ($75,000 - $52,613.82 = $22,386.15). 
It is readily apparent that if Gump & Ayers had known 
that the subject premises had already been leased to a 
replacement tenant, it would not have agreed to pay funds in 
excess of the rents accrued to the date of the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note. 
A promissory note which is procured by fraud is voidable 
at the option of the person defrauded. Suaarhouse Finance Co. 
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980); 37 Am. Jur. 2nd, Fraud 
and Deceit, § 8; State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, 755 P.2d 653 
(Okla. 1988). Kaus v. Privette, 529 P.2d 23 (Wash. App. 
1974); Havas v. Alaer, 461 P.2d 857 (Nev. 1969); Terrill v. 
Laney, 193 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1948); Dahl v. Crain, 237 P.2d 939 
(Ore. 1951). Moreover, the existence of fraud and related 
issues are questions of fact which must be resolved by the 
jury. Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1984); 
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 Pl2d 1009 (Utah 
1976). 
In the lower court, Union Park attempted to circumvent 
the fraud allegations by asserting that the fraudulent scheme 
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should be ignored because the fruits of the fraud were 
overcome by losses in connection with the lease to Matrix. In 
this regard, Union Park asserted it was "forced" to re-let the 
premises to Matrix at a lower rental (R. 60) and that it was 
"forced" to incur $18,559 for leasehold improvements (R. 60), 
thereby making its fraud immaterial. On the basis of these 
conclusory statements, Union Park claimed that it lost 
$50,656.41 in excess of the $75,000 it received from Gump & 
Ayers (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28-32, R. 60-63). It appears 
the trial court accepted these conclusory statements as a 
basis for ruling that the fraud on the part of Union Park was 
not material. See Transcript of Judge's ruling (R. 436-448) 
Addendum Exhibit "A". 
The acceptance by the trial court of these conclusory 
statements was erroneous. Conclusory statements are 
insufficient to support a summary judgment. Walker v. Rocky 
Mountain Recreation Company
 f 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973); 
Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc.. 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979). 
Furthermore, there is no authority in support of an argument 
that the fruits of fraud should be ignored when other "losses" 
exceed the fruits of the fraud. Such a ruling is clearly 
contrary to public policy. 
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Even if the conclusory statements asserted by Union Park 
could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the lower court still committed error in granting 
the summary judgment motion on the basis of such statements 
inasmuch as all of the elements of fraud, including 
materiality of the fraud, are factual questions that should be 
resolved by a jury. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 
557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1984); Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954). 
The conclusory statements that Union Park was "forced" to 
lease the subject premises at a lower rent and "forced" to 
make capital improvements were addressed in Interrogatories 
served on Union Park. Union Park's Answers to the 
Interrogatories revealed that the conclusory statements were 
based on other conclusory and self-serving statements giving 
rise to a myriad of factual issues. See Answers to 
Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, Addendum Exhibit "G". It is 
apparent that Union Park has not established the claimed 
"losses" sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of a summary 
judgment procedure. Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1962). 
There were no facts before the lower court which 
supported the conclusion that Union Park was "forced" to re-
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let the premises at a lower rate or that it was "forced" to 
provide capital improvements. Furthermore, Union Park has 
failed and refused to rebut claims that it has affiliations 
with Matrix,5 thereby providing an opportunity and incentive 
for less-than-arms-length-dealings with respect to reduced 
rents and capital improvements. 
The Order of August 25, 1992, should be reversed and the 
case remanded to the lower court to conduct a trial wherein 
the defense and claims of fraud will be considered in 
connection with Gump & Ayers1 liability under the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR "PER ANNUM" INTEREST UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the Promissory Note 
executed by Gump & Ayers in favor of Union Park provided as 
follows: 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned 
hereby promises to pay to the order of 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park 
5
 In opposing Union Park's first summary judgment 
motion, Gump & Ayers asserted that Union Park and Matrix were 
affiliated (R. 195). Thereafter, in written discovery, Gump 
& Ayers attempted to confirm such fact (Appendix Exhibit "G", 
Interrogatory No. 5). Union Park objected to the inquiry. 
(Ibid). The affidavits filed by Union Park in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment did not deny the claim of 
affiliation. 
26 
Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, 
the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 
DOLLARS ($55,000). This note shall bear 
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) 
from and after May 1, 1988. (Emphasis 
added). 
The evidence established that Union Park's attorney 
unilaterally drafted the provisions of the Promissory Note. 
It is apparent that if Union Park had intended the interest 
rate to be "per annum" rate, Union Park could easily have 
inserted the appropriate wording. The wording selected by 
Plaintiff clearly specifies a "flat" interest rate to be 
charged "from and after May 1, 1988." 
The lower court held that the wording of the Promissory 
Note was unambiguous and granted Union Park's summary judgment 
without consideration of extrinsic evidence submitted by both 
parties. Transcript of Court's ruling on November 30, 1992 
(R. 743-748), Addendum Exhibit "B"6. Neither party has 
6
 On page 4 of the Transcript (R. 746, lines 19-23), 
counsel for Gump & Ayers attempted to confirm that the court 
did not refer to extrinsic evidence on the interest question. 
However, it appears there is an error in the Transcript. Gump 
& Ayers believes that the words "this decision was made out of 
the consideration of the extrinsic evidence" should have been 
"this decision was made without consideration of the 
extrinsic." Gump & Ayers has requested the reporter to review 
her notes with respect to this aspect of the Transcript. At 
the time of the filing of this Brief, the reporter had not 
completed the review. In the event the error is confirmed by 
the reporter, Gump & Ayers refers the Court to the corrected 
Transcript. 
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challenged that aspect of the lower court's ruling. Thus, the 
issue before this Court, with respect to the interest rate, is 
determined on the basis of the above-quoted language of the 
Promissory Note. 
Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that the wording of the 
Promissory Note is clear and unambiguous and compels the 
conclusion that the interest rate of ten percent (10%) is a 
"flat rate" and there is no justification for inserting the 
words "per annum" into the wording of the Note. 
It is readily apparent that the decision of the lower 
court to re-write the Promissory Note to insert the words "per 
annum" into the paragraph relating to interest was contrary to 
the basic principles of contract law. 
In Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held: 
When a question arises regarding a 
written instrument, the first source of 
inquiry must be the document itself, 
considered in its entirety. . . . It is 
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons 
dealing at arm's length are entitled to 
contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts to relieve 
either party from the effects of a bad 
bargain . . . This court will not 
rewrite a contract simply to supply terms 
which the parties omitted. (Emphasis 
added). 
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The only basis upon which a court should involve itself 
in altering or amending the terms and provisions of a written 
contract is when the party pleads and establishes a cause of 
action for reformation. Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 
1980); Hottinaer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). Union 
Park has not 
pled a claim for reformation nor has Union Park established a 
basis for reformation. 
In order for Union Park to establish grounds to add the 
words "per annum" to the terms and provisions of the 
Promissory Note, it must plead and establish the following: 
There are two basic grounds for 
reformation of written instruments which 
do not correctly state and embody the 
intention and pre-existing agreement of 
the parties to the instrument, namely, 
(1) mutual mistake of the parties and (2) 
ignorance or mistake of the complaining 
party coupled with or induced by the 
fraud or inequitable conduct of the other 
remaining parties. I Thompson v. Smith, 
supra at p. 523). 
In this action Union Park has not pled or even suggested 
mutual mistake of fact or fraud on the part of Gump & Ayers. 
Moreover, inasmuch as Union Park drafted the Promissory Note, 
there is no possibility that Defendant fraudulently omitted 
the words "per annum" from the Promissory Note. 
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In the absence of a reformation claim and the failure to 
establish any grounds for reformation, there is no basis for 
the Court to rewrite the Promissory Note to provide for per 
annum interest. 
One of the grounds for the lower court's decision to 
include per annum interest in the Judgment, was the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3, which provide as follows: 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, 
any certain rate of interest is mentioned 
and no period of time is stated, interest 
shall be calculated at the rate mentioned 
by the year. 
It is readily apparent that the statute is not available 
to amend the provisions of the Promissory Note which Union 
Park prepared. The statute addresses a situation where "no 
time is stated." In this regard, the subject Note clearly 
states a time period, i.e., "ten percent (10%) from and after 
May 1, 1988." 
Accordingly, the statute does not permit the Court to 
rewrite the Promissory Note to insert provisions which Union 
Park chose to omit when it prepared the Promissory Note. 
The Order and Judgment of December 16, 1992, should be 
reversed with a determination by this Court that the interest 
rate stated in the Promissory Note is a flat rate of ten 
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percent (10%) applicable to the period commencing on the date 
the Note was executed to the date the last installment payment 
was due and payable, with interest at the statutory rate 
thereafter. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEREST RATE 
On October 1, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking a ruling that its obligations under 
the Promissory Note were limited to a "flat" interest rate of 
ten percent (10%) rather than a "per annum" rate. (R. 566). 
In this regard, the flat six percent (6%) rate should be 
applicable to the period commencing on the date the Note was 
executed and ending on the date the last installment was due 
and payable, with statutory interest thereafter. The Order 
and Judgment of December 16, 1992, denied the Motion (R. 606-
608, Addendum Exhibit "D"). 
On the basis of the wording of the Promissory Note and 
the authorities cited under Point III of this Brief, Gump & 
Ayers asserts that the lower court erred in denying the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and that the Order and Judgment 
should be reversed thereby establishing the flat interest rate 
stated in the Promissory Note. 
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CONCLUSION 
The denial of Gump & Ayers1 Motion to Amend its Answer 
and to assert a counterclaim imposed a penalty on Gump & Ayers 
and its attorney for its good faith attempts to comply with 
the provisions of Rule 11. The Order of August 25, 1992, 
denying Gump & Ayers Motion to Amend should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial on the issues raised by the 
proposed answer and counterclaim. 
The Order of August 25, 1992, granting summary judgment 
on the issue of liability under the Promissory Note 
constituted an error in law by reason of the evidence that the 
Promissory Note was procured by fraud. The Order should be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial so that the issue of 
Union Park's fraud may be considered in connection with Gump 
& Ayers1 liability under the Settlement Agreement and 
Promissory Note. 
The Order and Judgment of December 16, 1992, should be 
reversed and the interest obligation established as stated in 
the Promissory Note. 
DATED this ]^_ day of April, 1993. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MCPQNALD, WEST & BENSON 
AplA 
Robert M. McDonald 
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a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Friday, 
January 10, 1992. 
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311 South State #350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
455 East 500 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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1 FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1992 
2 JUDGE'S RULING 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. I 
4 appreciate your arguments and the thoroughness in which you 
5 presented this this afternoon. I have considered this and, 
6 as I told you before, I have read the memoranda and 
1 voluminous pleadings that have been submitted on this case. 
8 This is the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
9 Judgment to enforce a settlement agreement that was entered 
10 into by the parties at the time that the defendant terminate^ 
11 the lease unilaterally. Frankly, I have given the fraud 
12 claim considerable thought. I am frankly persuaded that if 
13 any misrepresentations were made, that under these facts the 
14 defendant has not shown by clear and convincing evidence 
15 that the misrepresentations were material for the reasons 
16 argued by the plaintiff's counsel, but here and in its 
17 I pleadings. 
This is a rather unusual kind of a ruling, I think 
19 J in these kinds of actions but there is a burden on the 
20 I defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
21 fraudulent misrepresentations were made or omissions in the 
22 face of the duty to speak. I am not convinced that there 
23 were misrepresentations, but there is some evidence to the 
24 J contrary. And so on that point, plaintiffs would not be 
25 I entitled to summary judgment alone. But it seems to me 
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that that, under all of the facts, including the contractual 
obligations which the defendants submit they did owe at 
that time, both having already accrued and what they were 
exposed to, and in light of the damages amounts that the 
plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the termination of 
the lease, and cost associated with re-letting, and all of 
that, when you look at all of the numbers that are involved, 
I just don't see this as material. I don't think that the 
defendants have met their burden of showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that there was fraud in the inducement 
in this action. For that reason then, I am not inclined 
to accord that view and would rather on the issue of 
liability grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Now, there are contested issues as to the amount 
of interest owing, whether it is ten percent or ten percent 
per annum; and we haven't addressed that today. Also, if 
there is any dispute about attorney's fees, we will need to 
deal with that as well. So, counsel, I would like you to 
address the issue of damages at this time, procedurally, 
just how you would like the Court to resolve that, 
MR. SWAN: Well, to be frank, Your Honor, I have 
not done any legal analysis of construction of interest 
rates when it is not -- when the phrase "per annum" is not 
set forth in the note. It would be my suspicion because of 
my practice, and I do this quite a bit, that that is a 
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phrase or an understanding of the note that the Court can 
infer, otherwise it is not sensical. Calculate interest on 
some kind of period. And I think we can show by the way 
that the defendants were calculating their own payments 
and by their own affidavit, they show how much they were 
paying. They were calculating it on a per annum basis. 
For instance, they owed their first payment so many months 
after the execution of the note. They paid the principal 
amount due, plus the accrued interest portion and that 
calculation is quite simple. It was ten percent per annum 
is what they were using. And so, I think that there is a 
clear showing by the conduct of the parties that there was 
a meeting of the minds that that meant a yearly basis. 
If the Court would like me to brief how the Court 
is supposed to construe that, I can do the calculation right 
here and show you that that is how they construed it them-
selves based upon their own affidavit. 
THE COURT: I don!t know that we are going to get 
this issue resolved today and I don't know on what other 
points the defendants might disagree with the amount of 
damages. I think the better way to handle this, unless 
Mr. Mc Donald has got a better idea, is to submit your 
judgment on the issue of liability and set forth the amount 
of damages. And if Mr. Mc Donald objects to that, then we 
can have a hearing on that. Unless, Mr. Mc Donald, do you 
00043J 
have another suggestion? 
MR. MC DONALD: The problem that I have, Your Honor 
and it is inherent in the ruling that has been made by the 
Court and that is this: that the case has been presented 
as a case for summary judgment on a note. It has been 
decided on the basis of something that I didn't regard as 
being an issue and that was their calculations of what would 
be due without the note. That isn't an issue that was raisedj 
to be addressed. There were substantial factual disputes 
with the manner in which they claimed this. When you say 
there is only 3,000 in dispute --
THE COURT: No, no. I am not talking about that. 
I am not talking about the amount of the note itself. The 
issues that I really see that remain unresolved as to 
damages, are the interest figure, attorney's fees and costs 
I don't see, you know, the basic underlying amount of the 
promissory note as remaining at issue. 
MR. MC DONALD: Well, in light of the Court's 
decisions, it is not. The problem I had with it is, and I 
guess maybe -- now that I hear the Court's basis for 
non-materiality, it is based upon a finding that their 
calculation of what would be due without the note are 
correct. 
THE COURT: That I used as an overall context. 
However, my ruling, my finding, was assuming there were 
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misrepresentations that were made, they are not material to 
the promissory note and the negotiations of the promissory 
note. And I find that because I felt that the defendants 
has by law the burden of proof, rather heavy burden of 
proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that they 
were in fact material, and I didn't see that that burden 
had been met. 
Now the only issues that I do see that remain to 
be resolved are whether the interest was per annum and as 
to that, I didn't focus on that as we prepared here today. 
But there is obviously contention about who drafted this 
note and therefore, you know, this may come down to a ruling 
of construction, you know, as to who drafted the note and 
whether it was ten percent or — 
MR. MC DONALD: It is parol evidence. 
THE COURT: Maybe it is parol evidence, but I 
think that that issue is an issue that remains in my mind 
and then the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Those are 
the only issues that I see that remain. 
MR. MC DONALD: Well, I can't conceive of how we 
can resolve those issues on summary judgment. So maybe we 
can attempt. I will certainly attempt to resolve this in 
light of the Court's ruling so we don't have to come back, 
but I can't conceive of how we can in this circumstance 
start resolving factual disputes. 
UUO'Mi 
1 THE COURT: Well, I am just looking for a procedural 
2 mechanism in which to resolve it. That is all. And if it 
3 is something that is reserved for trial because it canft 
4 be resolved summary-"fashion Ml -MI HM I ^  * ill hem-inm that 
5 is the way it will come out. 
6 However, I would like to address at least a couple 
7 of the other motions. I think with regard to the issue of 
£ damages, I am granting summary judgment on the issue of 
9 I i-abilitv .-.->. 'aintiff's motion. I am not 
IQ resolving today, I am not ruling on the issue, deciding one 
11 way or the other on the issue of damages. And that issue 
12 remains alive. If \ i v* M M I ! < » innlM" .1 s p e c i f i c mot.ion <»n t h e 
13 issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs, then you may do 
14 so, or if you are not able to resolve that by discussions 
15 between I In I I mi u! IHM vmi ,.-)« i I in nt- idnred pi I?PPP red 
1C for trial if no motion is filed. 
17 And with regard to the other pending motions, as 
111 to the Motion to Amend, implicit _L 
19 would deny the Motion to Amend to allege a counterclaim 
20 setting forth fraud as a cause of action. 
21 MR. Ml DONALD: You are denying the Motion to 
22 Amend? 
23 THE COURT: That is correct, and in so doing I 
24 donft find that it was unreasonably -- or rather, that it 
25 was untimely. I think that it was early enough in the 
C m •* *" # 
lawsuit, but rather I looked to the substantive issue of 
fraud and it doesn't make any sense to me that having found 
that -- I don't see that when the issue has been framed as 
to the claims of fraud, that there has been clear and 
convincing evidence to show, that it would make sense then 
to turn around and say, "Okay, now, amend your Answer and 
include the counterclaim on this very issue that I just said 
wasn't clear and convincing at this point." That is why 
I am denying the Motion to Amend. 
MR. MC DONALD: The problem I have, if the Motion 
to Amend is not granted, then fraud isn't before the Court 
on summary judgment. 
MR. SWAN: It is in the way of the affirmative 
defense on how to defend a motion. 
THE COURT: Well, you defend it on that basis and 
I considered it in that context. It was a pending motion 
I reserved on that. I indicated I had read all of the 
pleadings about it. Motion to Amend is denied. 
Now, are there any other motions that we need to 
deal with today? 
MR. MC DONALD: I think the others would be moot 
now. 
MR. SWAN: I believe so, Your Honor. The Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit of John Parsons, that was submitted 
in the support of their opposition memorandum. Our motion 
000443 
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for Protective Order is probably moot since there is no 
need for discovery. Just so the Court knows, we have 
answei: ed 11 ia 1: discovery belatedly II: : • t::i : } t: : g€ • 1: 1:1 :t i s i i a11:er 
cleaned up and maybe settle this case. So it was made moot 
by our own response to their discovery except for maybe theijr 
response f; ttorney ' ,* •, Urn ,- I Him I I now. 
Motion to compel, I think that is made moot. They] 
had a Motion to Strike our supplemental affidavits and I 
think the Court has allowed those appendix Irnplicit in its 
ruling and been willing to consider those. I think those 
THE COURT: Very well. Is there anything else 
then, counsel? 
MR. 1 1.c D0MAI ,D : W i 1 1 } : I prepare ai 0rder? 
(Talking to Mr. Swan.) 
THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Swan, I want you to prepare 
a j udgmen 1: ai Id 0rder in accordance w :I t: 1: I 1:1 ie i: it 11 i i Ig I:his 
afternoon, and do you need a scheduling in case? 
MR. SWAN: For a trial? 
THE COURT: No, I would 
Just in terms of a discovery cut-off, if you are not 
completed 
upon this 
and I can 
and cut-off for any other motions. 
MR. SWAN :: \ 1 E; J 11 :ii t: w o \ :i ] c:i b e i i} 1 Iope 11 i a t based 
Courtfs ruling of liability, that Mr. McDonald 
get together and resolve this issue on damages. 
8 
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, If his client still wants to fight, then maybe we will do 
those. I don't know what the position is going to be. 
THE COURT: Why don't you do this-- Oh, go ahead, 
Mr. Mc Donald. 
MR. MC DONALD: Why don't we address that? 
Obviously, neither of us have had an opportunity to think 
in the new context of the case. I would suggest that if 
in fact we are unable to agree and you think it is a 
summary judgment issue, we should file a supplemental or 
a different motion so we can now address what we didn't 
know we were going to have to address today. In the 
meantime, we will attempt to resolve it in light of the 
Court's ruling reserving all appeal rights and so forth 
so we can bring it to a conclusion. 
THE COURT: Well, do you see the need to do any 
additional discovery or you are just not prepared to 
17 analyze that? 
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MR. MC DONALD: Well, I don't think we will know 
that until we can determine whether we can resolve the 
damage issue. If the damage issue can be resolved, the 
case is over unless there is an appeal filed. 
THE COURT: Why don't you do this. If you see 
the need for -- if you are not able to resolve it satis-
factory between yourselves, then why don't you on or befor 
25 December 31st to file a proposed scheduling --
.4 .«• — " 
0 0 0 4 4,} 
1 MR. MC DONALD ou mean January? 
2 THE COURT: What did I say? 
3 MR. MC DONALD: December. 
4 THE COURT: I am looking at January 
5 December. File by January 31st a proposed schedule and 
6 , i l ' ' ' ' i " ..I i that is discovery cut-off and 
1 about two weeks after that a motion --a cut-off for any 
8 other dispositive motions you might have. And about a 
9 week after that, if r dispositive motions HTP filed, fhein 
10 a date by which one of you would file a Certification . 
11 Readiness for Trial. And at that point, then we will na\ • i 
12 a scheduling conference and schea., - a f:i i lal pretrial 
13 trial. But don't do that unless you find it necessary. 
14 In other words, if you can't resolve it otherwise. 
15 MR. SWAN . ">ne of my concerns , £our I Ic 'i IC i: , i s I 
16 am going to -- cause I don't take as copious of notes as 
1 j I i ii ill J n^ you rule, I am probably going to require a 
' transcript of the ruling portion of this hearina, 
19 make sure I have got everything in the Order. I don't 
20 long it will take to get something in order to 
21 I present something to Mr. Mc Donald. 
THE REPORTER: I can do it right away. 
23 I THE COURT: Dorothy says she can do it right away 
24 MR. SWAN: Then we should be able to meet that 
25 deadline. 
10 
22 
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' THE COURT: If you can, fine. I am not so concernep 
* about January 31st as I am if you — if you are not able to 
* J resolve it, then let's get a scheduling in place and then we 
can get this matter resolved. 
MR. MC DONALD: In light of the unknown, why don't 
we just have it at such a time as we find we are unable to 
negotiate, if we can. We will just file for a scheduling 
8
 conference and will go from there. 
o 
?
 I MR. SWAN: My anticipation if we can't agree on 
this interest rate issue, then I will file a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on that issue. I am pretty confident I 
think I know what the law is. 
THE COURT: All right. The final ruling will be 
this, in order to give you a little more time, if you are 
not able to resolve this then by February 14th, and that is 
more than a month down the road, if you are not able to 
resolve it by then, then submit a proposed schedule if you 
can agree on one. Okay? 
MR. MC DONALD: Otherwise, move for a scheduling 
conference? 
THE COURT: Well, no, just submit your respective 
one. I donft think we need to have another hearing about 
that. I am just looking for the easiest way to get that 
done. 
MR. MC DONALD: All right, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
* * * * * 
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3 0 . 1 9 9 2 : P.M. SESSION 
J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
I reviewed the motions and all the memoranda that 
have been submitted and the affidavits, and I am prepared to 
rule at this time on the motions. There are two motions before 
the Court: The Plaintiff's Motion for what is essentially a 
partial motion or a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The specific issue first to be resolved is the 
construction of the interest rate in the promissory note. Now, 
parties to a contract such as this are not entitled to a better 
contract than the one that they entered into. And having said 
that, it is incumbent upon the Court to make a first 
16j determination that in a contract dispute whether the underlying 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
contract, in this case the promissory note, is clear and 
unambiguous. 
And in this particular case, the language that is 
relevant to the interest rate makes no mention of a per annum 
interest rate. It doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest 
rate either. I don't think there is any ambiguity about that 
23, contract in and of itself, just that it's missing a term. 
24 
25 
It seems to me that in looking at that, and also 
looking at the other language, "interest to accrue," or the 
000744 
aceru nguage 
<_ ^.^ *^i annum interest rate. „ -.:_.. you nave n;^ part 
^e contract fh<=» n o ^ making reference t-o "accn 
aweo uu,/ make sense ii there is a fc: annum rate, >elieve, 
as a matter of 1 -w ?,~A "«**• tbore is no mention whether the 
rate is to jje a tidt tate oi an accruing rate. *i -^ wer e a 
flat irate, then you might even have an ambiguous note, but 
1 kill- " «» ' "i! i '(••"".in I I "«, I lip i issue before the court. 
The plaintiff :-lie, !' statute which sets forth 
1
 .ji it! I ;•; I ILi-i pr "ii '"» '1" 'ii ' -^  
other documents mentioned a - not mentioned whether a 
ii a I i» III' i i in 
no rate l hat's mentioned. And I paraphrase in very rough 
II .1 I'iU, Ill I II • I' .1 III .-• 
As I look at the statute, in looking at tihis 
Dromissory note, it appears to me m 
s wel* •* 'if* statute does control _.. ... - - i •= 
ioes provide the Court the justif ,** for inser* 
i a contract The parties are not entitled to a better 
contract than the one t ey entered into, and generally 
courts do not imply terms or read terms or add terms to a 
contract, But in this case I think tine legislature has done 
just that. 
And therefore, for those reasons and the other 
reasons set forth by Mr. Swan on behalf of the plaintitl, I am 
l! going to grant partial summary judgment in favor of the 
2 plaintiff and deny that aspect of summary judgment on behalf of 
3 the defendant. 
4 Then as to the question of late fees and attorney's 
5j fees, the contract provided for the payment of late fees when 
6 payments were, in fact, late- And it appears to me as I look 
7j at that, that the contract is clear and unambiguous, that late 
8 fees were to apply. And finally with regard to attorney's 
9j fees, clearly attorney's fees are appropriate for enforcing the 
10 rights under that promissory note. In this case the plaintiff 
11 has prevailed on the issues that it has advanced. And 
12 consistent with that provision, the Court also grants summary 
13 judgment on the issue of attorney's fees. 
14j And there has not been -- well, in any event, for 
15 1 those reasons I am going to grant summary judgment as prayed 
§ 
16| for by the plaintiff and deny it as to the defendant. 
17 Is there anything I have overlooked? 
18 Counsel. 
19 MR. McDONALD: In preparing the order I take it that 
20 we can insert that, so there is no question as to the basis of 
21 the Court's decision, that this decision was made out of the 
22 consideration of the extrinsic evidence. 
23| THE COURT: That is correct. 
24 
25 
MR. SWAN: Your Honor, you have called it a partial 
summary judgment. I believe this resolves all the issues. 
00074T-
I I '" m i I ;" L«.I if I I in I ! j e e a u , , . . H l I P M W . J L . I i n I H I |" I t I i i I I I i ' a 
final judgment as fai ;••- ^* -ssues. 
THE COURT: Thai fs my understanding,, ^ Swan. I 
w a n t you to prepare an wider I O L this Motion for Summary 
Judgment T **->**• «~v f ~ prepare a judgment consistent with all 
these rulings. 
Now, yen: d~ ~-4~ h~v- * - prepare findings cf fir4: 
8; - f to more 
91 a r gumen 15 , v -1 u - • .* found a r: £ ^ r.: • ** a 5: 1 x 
10 
. r;^  highlights of '.• bases • the C:u:' 'z decision. : : 
»d 
13 * .,- practice ct at least tryin- *. 1emember to say, "and for 
141 r. „ ,-
15j consistent with the Court". - .. ing can also be considered. But 
16>; . „ . . ;.ose arguments r. ...... oersuasive under 
•.he facts of the case and in looking at that note and that 
181 statute. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23| 
j 
2 4! 
25! 
MR. SWAN : I ' h a 11 k y o u , y o u r H o 11 o r . 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
(This concludes the Judge's Bench Ruling.) 
ic ie ic 
0 0 07-4 
20 
21 
22 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
3 j STATE OP UTAH ) 
j • 
4 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I am 
6 a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
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I 
11 Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. Stirba, j 
I 
! 
12 and thereat reported in stenotype all of the proceedings had j 
13 therein. 
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m ~~~m nrm ••**• •>•«• mrm •**% «««• mr-m —ram 
2 31 • ^ :':&is\ CJL... . 1 - ":c:< 3 
24 
25j My commission expires: 
1 April 1995 
i -4 .-•&<££*$ H Scur.j.-u, b - h 34010 i 
: v \ ^ £ ^ * ' »'«ty C&ntrdzticn Expires J 
3 ^J^yy April 1,1999 I 
~»-am am «wa sate «.v» taw SOB ex* tarn oa» eaa otaa o n «n» *aJ 
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Court 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State Street 
Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Union Park Associates 
USTRICT COURT !>l "  n M,T I! AKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES 
Limited Partnership, 
I "1 a I ntJ f £ , 
vs. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900906725 L 
J iicige a ni I E 1 1 Stirba 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for 
hearing on January 10 1992 at 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Anne 
11 Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled \^\:-t 
Plaintiff, Union Park Associates, was represented by its cou:..e. 
record, Mark S, Swan of the law firm Richer, Swan & Overholt, r 
Defendant dump K Ayers was represented by u s counsel of record, 
Robert M. McDonald of the 1aw firm McDonald & Bullen. The Court 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having heard oral 
EXHIBIT 
AIL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO J 
0004 < C 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted 
against Defendant Gump & Ayers as to liability only. The issues of 
the calculation of damages and attorney's fees are reserved for 
further ruling by this Court. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Amend its Answer and assert a 
Counter-Claim is hereby denied with prejudice. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order is hereby 
granted. 
4. All further Motions before this Court are deemed to be 
moot based upon the Court' ^ -ruling hferein. 
DATED this of July A 1992. 
BY THE COURT:""-
HONORABLE 'ANNE^tf^STIRBA-3 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t iGourt J u d g e 
00047i 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 i;iei"ei}\/ i t-L i. 1.1 j i m i l me \<^ ' Jttiy-, 1992, I « id 
a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as f . >ws: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0 0 0 4 7 2 
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Salt Lake County Utah 
DEC 1 :\ 1992 
i& ^«>l tour 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SHAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State Street 
Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8532 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Union Park Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above-
entitled Court on November 30, 1992 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by its counsel of record, Mark S. Swan of 
the law firm Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. Defendant was 
represented by its counsel of record, Robert M. McDonald of the law 
firm McDonald, West & Benson. The Court having reviewed the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting 
EXHIBIT 
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ALL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO. 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
documentation and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
supporting documentation, and after hearing oral argument thereon 
and after being fully advised in the premises and based upon the 
Court previously entering an Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
which was entered on August 25, 1992 establishing the Defendant's 
liability to Plaintiff, and the Court having made its ruling from 
the bench, hereby orders as follows: 
1• Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied with 
prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of 
the calculation of damages and attorney's fees is hereby granted. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against the Defendant in 
the amount of $35,157.59 as of July 9, 1990 with interest accruing 
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum thereafter until paid in full. 
4. Plaintiff is further awarded a Judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of $110.50, representing the costs incurred herein and 
the sum of $7,110.00, representing attorney's fees expended herein, 
for a total of $7,220.50, plus interest thereon at the contract 
rate of 10% per annum from the date of the entry of this Judgment 
until paid in full. 
5. It is further Ordered that this Judgment shall be 
2 
UuOGO t 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
augmented in the amount of costs and attorney's fees expended in 
collecting said Judgment, by execution or otherwise, as shall be 
established by Affidavit. 
DATED thisyCKVVday of December, 1992. ^"rr"^ > 
BY THE COU^ Tr'"" ' 
HONORABL^A^NET-M. SXZRBA 
Third Dis£ri^_C5)ixaffc Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <Q^_ day of December, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by hand delivering the same, addressed as 
follows: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND 
MUTUAL RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
This Settlement Agreement/and Mutual Release of Claims is 
entered into this 7th day ofnMQwemhsr, 1988, by and between 
Union Park Associates (hereinafter, "Union Park") and Gump & 
Ayers Real Estate, Inc. (hereinafter, "Gump & Ayers"). 
1. On June 28, 1985, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump & 
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the 
lease of approximately 912 sq. ft- of the second floor of the 
office building located at approximately 1150 East Fort Union 
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a 
term of eight years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" 
2. On June 1, 1983, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump & 
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the 
lease of approximately 4,567 sq. ft. of the second floor of the 
office building located at approximately 1150 East Forth Union 
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a 
term of ten years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth below and 
with the intent of being legally bound, the parties hereto agree 
as follows: 
3. Payment. Upon execution of this Agreement, (a) Gump & 
Ayers will pay to Union Park the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000); (b) on December 15, 1988, Gump & Ayers will pay to 
Union Park an additional sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000); 
in addition, (c) Upon the execution of this Agreement Gump & 
Ayers will execute and deliver to Union Park a Promissory Note in 
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and will pay to Union 
Park the additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($55,000) 
on the terms, and in the manner, set forth in said Promissory 
Note. 
4- Mutual General Releases. (a) For and in consideration 
of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, Union Park, for itself, its successors and 
assigns, does hereby fully and forever release, acquit and 
discharge Gump & Ayers, its successors, assigns and any others 
who have acted or who are acting on its behalf, from any and all 
claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, causes of action or 
any suits at law or equity, whether known or unknown to Union 
Park, which Union Park may have against Gump & Ayers which claims 
arise from any act or omission of Gump & Ayers committed prior to 
the date of this Anr^mpnt. the Lease Agreements specified in . 
EXHIBIT " 
Paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased 
premises by Gukp & Ayers and/or the use of the leased premises by 
Gump & Ayers. 
(b) For and in consideration of the mutual covenants 
contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Gump & 
Ayers, for itself, its successors and" assigns, does hereby fully 
and forever release, acquit and discharge Union Park, its 
successors, assigns and any others who have acted or who are 
acting on its behalf from any and all claims, demands, 
obligations, liabilities, causes of action or any suits at law or 
equity, whether known or unknown to Gump & Ayers which Gump & 
Ayers may have against Union Park which claims arise from any act 
or omission of Union Park, the Lease Agreements specified in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased 
premises by Gump & Ayers and the use of the leased premises by 
Gump & Ayers. 
5. Rescission of Lease. For the consideration of the 
covenants contained herein, the parties agree that the lease 
agreements specified in paragraphs nos. 1 and 2, above, are 
hereby mutually rescinded and that except as provided in this 
agreement, both parties are hereby released from any and all 
obligation contained within said lease agreements. 
6. Default. In the event Gump & Ayers shall default in a 
payment of $10,000.00 due on December 15, 1988 as set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, such payments shall be subject to a late 
charge at a rate equal to 18 percent per annum until paid. Any 
default in the payment of any sum set forth in the Promissory 
Note shall be subject to the late fee as set forth within the 
Promissory Note. In the event either party defaults in the 
performance of any term of this Agreement, the defaulting party 
agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
incurred by the non-defaulting party. 
The mutual releases contained herein and the mutual recision 
of the Lease Agreements contained herein are dependant upon the 
full performance by Gump & Ayers of its obligations contained in 
this Agreement and contained in the Promissory Note. In the 
event Gump & Ayers defaults in any of its obligations set forth 
in this Agreement or the performance of any obligation set forth 
in the Promissory Note, Union Park Associates shall be entitled, 
by its election, to retain all funds received prior to the 
default and to either (1) its actual damages under the Lease 
Agreements less all funds received under this Agreement and 
Promissory Note prior to the default or (2) the full 
consideration as provided in this agreement and the Promissory 
Notes. 
7. Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge that this 
2 POOIOJ 
compromise and release has been entered into freely and with the 
advice of counsel and that no representations of fact or opinion 
has been made by either party or by anyone acting in their behalf 
to induce this compromise with respect to the nature of their 
claims and damages, 
DATED this lT day of Novembitf, 1988. 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES 
By <jl*M 9710^ 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
Id uniogump.rel 
3
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$55,000.00 December "Movombsg 7 / 1988 
Principal Amount 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby promises to pay 
to the order of UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park Center, 
Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND 
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($55,000.00). This note shall bear interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988. 
Said sum shall be due and payable to the holder hereof in 
eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal in the amount of 
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date of each such 
payment. 
Said payments to be made as follows: Payments shall 
commence on May 1, 1989 and continue thereafter, on the first day 
on each successive month, through and including the month of 
October, 1989. No payment shall be due for the months of 
November, 1989 through April, 1990. Thereafter, payments shall 
be due, as stated above, commencing on May 1, 1990 and continuing 
thereafter, on the first day of each successive month through and 
including the month of October, 1990. No payment shall be due 
for the months of November, 1990 through April, 1991. 
Thereafter, payments shall be due as stated above, commencing on 
May 1, 1991 and continuing thereafter on the 1st day of each 
successive month until all principal and accrued interest is paid 
in full. 
This note may be prepaid in whole or in part without 
penalty. 
This note shall at the option of any holder hereof be 
immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
1. Failure to make any payment due hereunder within 15 days 
of its due date. 
2. Brea<-:: of any condition of the Security Agreement on 
property granted as collateral or security for this note. 
3. Upon the filing by the undersigned of an assignment for 
the benefit of creditors, bankruptcy, or for relief under any 
provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; or by suffering an 
involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership to be filed 
and not vacated within 30 days. 
In the event this note shall be in default, and placed with 
an attorney for collection, then the undersigned agrees to pay 
all reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection. Payments 
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not made within five (5) days of due date shall be subject to a 
late charge of-1.5% of said payment. All payments hereunder 
shall be made to the address set forth above or to such address 
as may from time to time be designated by any holder hereof. 
The undersigned agrees to remain fully bound hereunder until 
this note shall be fully paid. The undersigned further waives 
demand, presentment and protest and all notices thereto and 
further agrees"to remain bound, notwithstanding any extension, 
modification, waiver or other indulgence by any holder or upon 
the exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted 
as security for this note. No modification or indulgence by any 
holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any 
indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any 
other future occasion. The rights of any holder hereof shall be 
cumulative and not necessarily successive. This note shall be 
construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
This note is subject to a Security Agreement of even date. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
By 
President 
Id uniogump.not 
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Mark S. Swan - 3873 
David W. Overholt - A3846 
RICHER/ SWAN & OVERHOLT, P,C, 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State Street 
Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Union Park Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, 
INC- , 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 900906725 CV 
Judge: Anne M. Stirba 
INTERROGATORY NO, 1; How much of the square footage 
involved in the leased premises was included in the 10,039 square 
feet leased to Matrix Funding Corporation on November 23, 1988? 
ANSWER: All of the square footage of the leased premises was 
included in the space leased to Matrix Funding Corporation by lease 
dated November 23, 1988 and occupied January 1, 1989. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Apart from Matrix Funding 
Corporation, Miles, Inc. and Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., has any person or 
EXHIBIT 
ALLSTATE LEGAL SUPPLY 0 0 
entity occupied, used or benefitted from all or any portion of the 
leased premises since May, 1988? If so, answer the following: 
(a) The name of the person or entity who occupied, used 
or benefitted from the leased premises; 
(b) The date said person or entity occupied, used or 
benefitted from the leased premises; 
(c) Describe the nature of the occupancy, use or 
benefit. 
ANSWER: Assuming that Gump & Ayers left the leased premises 
in May, 1988, which they apparently dispute, Plaintiff is unaware 
of any other person or entity which occupied the leased premises 
since that date, other than the entities listed by Defendant. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State all facts upon which you rely 
in support of your claim that Plaintiff was "forced" to make 
improvements as noted in Paragraph 30 of the Affidavit of Thomas 
Lloyd. With respect to each such fact, answer the following: 
(a) The name and address of the person who has or claims 
to have personal knowledge as to such facts; 
(b) Identify any documents which you claim support the 
existence of any such facts. 
ANSWER: Defendant is obviously troubled by the use of the 
word "forced" in the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd. This word was 
chosen as the best explanation of the commercial necessities to 
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improve and modify the leased premises to make it suitable to the 
incoming tenant. One factor that led to the need to make 
improvements is the fact that the occupancy of the Defendant of the 
space had caused a certain amount of wear and tear which was not 
acceptable to the prospective tenant. Furthermore, Gump & Ayers 
had a distinctive decorating scheme, with colors of black and 
green, which was not acceptable to the incoming tenant. 
Consequently, the decorating scheme was not usable by any other 
perspective tenant. Further, it is standard in the industry for 
the landlord to make leasehold improvements to the lease space to 
accommodate the needs of the incoming tenant. Consequently, when 
Matrix Funding negotiated for the lease space, they negotiated for 
certain changes to the space, including new carpet, a change in 
walls and other similar items. These items of improvements were 
specifically negotiated and were minimized in order to keep the 
cost of the improvements down, without having to pass those costs 
through to the new tenant. 
Union Park, as a landlord, also had a legal duty to mitigate 
its damages by the re-letting of its premises. Because a landlord 
must take positive steps to re-let the premises, the cost 
associated with the readying ef the property for re-letting of the 
premises, is its necessary, more often than not, to incur costs of 
repairs and alterations to meet the needs of a new tenant. 
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Therefore, the commercial realities and the legal duties combined 
to "force" Plaintiff to make improvements to the property. 
Those persons which have knowledge of the negotiations and 
factors concerning the improvements are Tom Lloyd, of Terra 
Industries and Richard Emery of Matrix Funding. Tom Lloyd's 
address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, 
and Richard Emery's address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 250, 
Midvale, Utah 84 047. Plaintiff is not aware of any documents 
which exist regarding the negotiations between Plaintiff and Matrix 
Funding for the improvements made to the property as those 
improvements were orally negotiated. Plaintiff does have copies of 
documents that relate to the cost of the improvements, which 
Defendant may obtain upon request. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4; State all facts upon which you rely 
in support of your claim that Plaintiff was "forced" to renegotiate 
the lease with Matrix Funding Corporation as noted in Paragraph 28 
of the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd. With respect to each such fact, 
answer the following: 
(a) The name and address of the person who has or claims 
to have personal knowledge as to such facts; 
(b) Identify any documents which you claim support the 
existence of any such facts. 
ANSWER: Again, Defendant seems troubled by the use of the 
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word "forced". Perhaps a better phrase would have been 
"commercially necessary". It is a usual course of business for a 
landlord to re-lease property at the then-prevailing lease rates. 
Consequently, when negotiations began for the leasing of the 
premises with Matrix Funding, the current market value of that 
space was taken into account. Other factors included the need to 
meet Matrix Funding's existing needs, an attempt to find the best 
available tenant, the size of the space, how quickly a tenant could 
be located to minimize the impact of loss of lease revenues, and 
the fact that relatively minor renovations were incurred in 
conjunction with the improvement of this lease space for Matrix 
Funding. It is the opinion of Tom Lloyd, who has been in the 
business for sixteen (16) years and who has negotiated numerous 
leases at Union Park Plaza, that the lease with Matrix Funding in 
November, 1988 was set at the relevant market rent, given all of 
these factors. 
Persons who have knowledge of the negotiations and factors 
concerning the negotiation of the Matrix Funding Corporation lease 
are Tom Lloyd of Terra Industries and Richard Emery of Matrix 
Funding. Tom Lloyd's address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 500, 
Midvale, Utah 84047. Richard Emery's address is 6925 Union Park 
Center, Suite 250, Midvale, Utah 84047. Plaintiff is not aware of 
any documents which exist regarding the negotiations between 
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Plaintiff and Matrix Funding for the lease rate as those 
negotiations were all done orally. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: State the name and address of each 
and every person or entity who has been a general or limited 
partner and every person or entity who has been a general or 
limited partner in the Plaintiff organization since January 1, 
1987. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to the scope of Interrogatory No. 
5 in that it goes beyond the issues presented in Plaintiff's 
Complaint for the enforceability of a Settlement Agreement. 
However, if Defendant were willing to enter into a Confidentiality 
Agreement with regard to the non-disclosure of the names and 
persons who are involved as general and limited partners of the 
Plaintiff, then Plaintiff may be inclined to disclose the 
information requested by the Defendant. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify each and every transaction, 
contract or agreement to which Plaintiff and Matrix Funding 
Corporation have both been parties since January 1, 1987. Include 
in your answer the following: 
(a) The date of the transaction, contract or agreement; 
(b) Identify all -documents arising out of or in any 
manner connected with each transaction, contract or agreement. 
ANSWER: The only transaction between Plaintiff and Matrix 
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Funding is the lease entered into dated November 23, 1988 of the 
former premises of Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., which is the 
subject of this litigation. Defendant has all the documentation 
regarding that lease transaction. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 (sic): Has Plaintiff and Matrix Funding 
Corporation had any common employee since January 1, 1987? If so, 
answer the following: 
(a) The name and address of the common employee; 
(b) The nature of the services performed by said 
employee for Plaintiff; 
(c) The nature of the services performed by said 
employee for Matrix Funding Corporation; 
(d) The percentage contribution of Plaintiff and Matrix 
Funding Corporation to compensation to said person. 
ANSWER: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Since January 1, 1987, has Plaintiff 
and Matrix Funding corporation shared office space or facilities? 
If so, answer the following: 
(a) Describe the shared office space; 
(b) State the dates the office space was shared; 
(c) Describe the financial arrangement with respect to 
the shared office space; 
(d) Describe the facilities that were shared; 
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(e) State the dates the facilities were shared; 
(f) Describe the financial arrangement with respect to 
such sharing arrangement. 
ANSWER: No. 
DATED this 71^ day of August, 1991. 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Limited Partnership/ 
By: ^ 7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Thomas Lloyd,' G e n e r a l P a r t n e r 
s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of August, 1991, personally appeared before me 
Thomas Lloyd, General Partner of Union Park Associates, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, after being first duly sworn upon oath, 
acknowledged to me that said individual has read the foregoing 
instrument, believes the contents thereof, and executed the same of 
the individuals free act and desire. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this £!**> day of August, 
NOTAIV? PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, 
larlt S. Swan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Union Park Associates 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the SO™ day of August, 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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